LMSC Futures

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What Might The Quick Boys and Springboks Look Like In 2012-13?

In speaking with the various families who made the time to sit down with me over the past few weeks at LMSC, a couple themes have proven consistent.  Firstly, because it's fun, and because it directly answers areas of a couple of the players' interest, I wanted to show a quick example of how I would envision the two wing backs in a 4-3-3 to play.  This may also provide some further insight into why tactical instruction is limited in its effectiveness at the younger age groups, particularly when playing small-sided matches.

To keep it brief:

Chelsea's staring lineup against Southampton (a 4-2-3-1 if we want to split hairs...but couldn't that just be a 4-3-3 in another form?)












Ashley Cole can be seen in this StatsZone screen grab receiving many of the balls played to him in the middle and attacking thirds, and when compared to Hazard's grapic below, it is clear that Cole spends more of his time (by percentage) in wider areas than Hazard, the nominal "wide" midfielder.  11 of the 24 passes Cole received came over midfield, and all in the width of the curtain of the 18 - one weird little outlier in the penalty area makes for 12 passes...

Hazard, by comparison, got most of his passes more central than the curtain of the 18 up until the 18th minute when he switched sides to see if he could offer the hugely talented youngster Shaw (17 years old...) at left back for Southampton a different challenge from Mata, namely, pace.  The lone pass on the right side was the first of many Chelsea played to Hazard over the next 20 minutes on that side to try to trip Shaw up.  Point being, Hazard clearly played centrally so that Cole had room to attack on the touchline.

Here's a grab of the match, in which we see Cole on the width, Hazard central and David Luiz, the center back, carrying the ball forward to create a 3 v. 3 situation deep in the Southampton half.  Notice the lone striker near the penalty area, outnumbered five to one (yes, GKs count) with a sixth Southampton defender dropping back on the very right edge of the shot.  With defenses so committed to working this hard, it is necessary for offenses to send more players forward to create numbers-up situations (and offer the predictable weak points by doing so; gaps in the back line, easy transition goals, exhaust themselves too fast, etc.)

For a more stark example, see the Leighton Baines/Steven Pienaar combo on the left side of Everton's lineup (Baines the left back, Pienaar the left midfielder):

Baines is having a torrid season (as is Pienaar) with both men benefiting from the use of Fellaini as a more attacking presence (rather than the holding central mid role he played a year ago) where his sheer size as a target, and his skill once the long or high ball is played to him, forces defenses to focus less on the wingers than the central area.

Clearly, these two teams have used the wing backs to provide a great deal of attacking presence on the flanks.  A great many teams play in this fashion.  As a final example, from the Chelsea/Southampton tilt, see the 17 year old Shaw for So'ton contribute directly to the tying goal at Stamford Bridge.  (Ironic that after coming back from 2-0 down at the half, So'ton fired their manager, whereas Rafa Benetiz remains for Chelsea despite what has to be seen as two points lost.)

Shaw steals a pass, and immediately gets it off his foot to his teammate directly upfield...













...Shaw then takes off on an overlap, and the counter attack is on as he receives the second pass of the 1-2.  An equally youthful Eden Hazard over-pursues the first pass, and leaves Shaw valuable room to run into...















...And in case you thought Hazard was fast, we can easily see here that Shaw outruns him with the ball on his foot for some 66 yards until, in this final grab, he serves the ball to Puncheon (not yet in the photo) for a two-touch finish.  Granted, it is a counter-attack, but almost any top-flight match in this era will feature outside backs who are fully capable of providing this sort of offensive presence from both build-up play and counter-attacking movements.  For all the glory grabbed by the central boys, and the ones with so many goals, the best players on the park may well be the guys who are fast enough, fit enough, skilled enough, and, oh, yes, world class defenders to boot, to play this position.

Of course, these are incredible athletes who have incredible teammates- even those poor guys at So'ton, you snobby bandwagon jumpers who support Chelsea, Man U, Arsenal, Liverpool and the johnny-come-latelys who adore Man City!  These kids can play.  Will a group of U13s replicate this?  No.  But they can damn sure try...and they'll learn that keeping possession makes getting backs forward far easier.  And it'll take much slower training sessions, more "chalk talk" type sessions, less playing and more scripting.  So the corresponding development of greater maturity becomes as important as being able to pass, receive and run with the ball; if the players can't sit still long enough for technical work, they aren't mature enough (no prejudice here...just the facts) to go through sessions talking about the importance to spacing of a yard here, and a yard there.  To underline this, consider Dani Alves, Barcelona right back who has covered himself with glory the last few seasons but has begun to struggle- and who has never quite affected his national team's outcomes (with Brazil) the way one might expect...

When the Argentine became Barcelona's central forward, Pedro Rodriguez (not Barcelona's most talented player, but arguably the most comfortable with the side's integrated movement) knew exactly which runs to make to allow Alves forward. The positioning of the winger was always key, and when Alves played right back for Brazil in this period, he spent half the time shouting at a teammate to get out of his way.   (Italics mine)

(read the whole article here) for some telling insights as to how difficult it really is to "just run up the field!"  It's a fine example of the paradox that when anything is done really, really well, it is so simple and yet so complex simultaneously.

Additional reading from the 2011-12 EPL campaign on the same topic here.